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For future historians, the salient fact of the twentieth-century finance will be the sharp erosion 
of banker power – that is, the dwindling role of financial intermediaries. 
Ron Chernow, The Death of the Banker (1997), p. xii. 
 
The purpose of this presentation is to trace some of the key developments of Deutsche Bank’s 
over  130-year-long  history  with  American  markets  in  order  to  draw  or  reinforce  some 
observations about 21
st century financial architecture, specifically about the roles played by 
financial  intermediaries  in  cross-border  finance.    Although  it  implicitly  deals  with 
transatlantic intellectual, regulatory, and financial exchanges, especially those between the 
United States and Germany, it is comparative across periods, not countries.     
My contribution will explore several questions.  How could banks like Deutsche Bank 
circa 1900 successfully engage in substantial amounts of international investment banking 
with neither a branch nor a subsidiary in the world’s largest and fastest growing economy, 
despite that economy’s weak regulatory environment?  Today, in a world with seemingly 
limitless access to information – permitting a great deal of disintermediation and reduction in 
physical presence in many sectors – why do many  commercial banks seem compelled to 
become multi-poled, international matrix organizations (transnational institutions)?  Whereas 
in 1900 huge amounts of cross-border transfers and investment were arranged, monitored and 
even  distributed  by  private  (mostly  family)  banks  and  funneled  through  correspondent 
                                                 
1 This paper profited from many useful comments by Mira Wilkins, Louise Guenther, Patrick Gougeon, Michael 
Tröge, and Martin Mueller.  It was presented in April 2008 at Columbia University’s School of International 
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  2 
networks, today huge joint-stock companies dominate international finance.   By operating 
branches and subsidiaries in key markets with highly automated systems for trading foreign 
exchange  and  other  products  as  well  as  for  applying  modern  risk  management,  and  by 
maintaining  cross-border teams  for deal making and distribution of securities, these  giant 
public banks have incurred huge new fixed expenditures.  By doing so, though, they have 
internalized activities that were once performed by individuals and institutions in large part 
legally independent of one another.  The story of this transition is a complex mixture of 
technological,  economic,  and  political  changes,  with  a  little  path  dependency  for  good 
measure.     
  The ideas that will be presented here are not only part of my recent research into the 
history of Deutsche Bank, but also part of other work on private (family) banking, the theory 
of  financial  firms’  foreign  investment,  and  several  articles  with Jeff  Fear  on  comparative 
corporate governance in Germany and the United States. 
  In general, I hope to show that the above quote by Ron Chernow misconstrues the real 
change in banker power during the 20
th century.  Although certain kinds of intermediary 
banking functions and actors – for example, the active management of firms and family banks 
(the banking dynasties that are Chernow’s main focus) – have been largely superseded by 
other mechanisms and institutions in our world, banking and bankers have shifted into other 
activities, which may indeed give them more economic clout, but about which we may still be 
woefully ignorant.   
Specifically,  I  will  argue  that  regulatory  changes  along  with  changes  in  the  real 
economy through much of the 20
th century – probably most rapidly in the past 40 years – have 
reshaped the distribution and innovation of financial securities (as well as the disappearance 
of  other  instruments),  leading  to  a  kind  of  “snowball  effect.”    These  developments  have 
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centers, increasing their fixed, up-front investment and the managerial complexity of doing 
business  compared  with  their  activities  in  the  19
th  century.    This  investment  and  added-
managerial capacity in turn produces an economic incentive to expand activities further to 
diversify  by  products  and  by  region  in  order  to  reduce  the  costs  of  delivering  complex 
services.   
In  general  these  developments  have  occurred  in  a  financial  environment  that  has 
become  increasingly  denationalized,  that  is,  one  in  which  many  of  the  most  important 
financial  transactions  and  actors  are  outside  of  any  national  jurisdiction.      Along  with  a 
reduction on controls over the movements of funds, governments have abdicated to markets 
and private institutions responsibility for preserving certain kinds of macroeconomic stability 
and reduction of risk.  This environment produces incentives for private institutions to replace 
governmental and supra-governmental agencies, to act as market makers and market linkages.  
In addition to the loss of national regulatory control, modern transfer methods and the foreign 
direct investment of many of their sophisticated customers have linked national economies in 
new ways and robbed commercial banks of some of their “bread and butter” business such as 
letters of credit.   
Financial regulations in the United States and some other countries, moreover, have 
led to the grouping of investment in intermediaries – such as highly regulated pension and 
mutual funds – under statutory pressure and with economic incentives to optimize returns 
with lots of relatively small and often short-term investments on a worldwide scale.  They 
seek  to  find  “special  opportunities”  and  effective  diversification,  not  to  manage  these 
investments.
2   Spearheaded by political decisions in the world’s largest capital market, the 
                                                 
2 See Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Shareholders (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) for an 
extensive study of the development of American corporate governance from active management by strong 
shareholder representatives to financial intermediaries forced by law to limit their holdings of individual assets.  
Investment funds existed in the 19
th century.  Deutsche Bank itself tried to organize one for American securities 
(original purpose of the Treuhand), before the bottom fell out of American capital markets in 1893.  It also set up 





































8From International to Transnational Finance  - April 2008 
 
  4 
United States, much of capital market control and corporate governance responsibility has 
been  shifted  away  from  banks  (underwriters)  to  government  agencies,  accounting  firms, 
“transparent” accounting systems, and rating agencies.  Even those institutions with national 
roots,  however,  are  obliged  to  provide  their  governance  services  across  national  borders.  
Although companies all over the world have had to deal with disgruntled shareholders and 
managers are under pressure to take more personal responsibility for their decisions, under the 
influence  of  global  equity  investors,  institutions  for  the  active  management  of  firms  by 
shareholders  and  governments  have  been  increasingly  replaced  by  so-called  market 
mechanisms and a “buyer-beware” approach to governance.  Moreover, national regulations, 
or  perhaps  more  accurately  the  lack  thereof,  have  led  to  the  creation  of  new  sources  of 
liquidity (“offshore deposits”) and intermediaries (for example, hedge funds) that are largely 
independent  of  national  controls,  facilitating  the  quick  movement  among  different  asset 
classes and geographic regions, but which are often administered in money-market centers.   
As with many economic sectors, these developments have encouraged financial firms 
to  become  transnational,  that  is,  to  become  highly  coordinated  (but  not  centralized) 
multinationals that internalize many international activities by “crossing borders” rather than 
by connecting nations.
3  When knowledgeable clients and market participants can react with 
the “speed of light” to market movements and opportunities, institutions like Deutsche Bank 
understandably believe that a close connection to market developments and key actors will 
hone their ability to rapidly innovate and distribute products, essential elements in remaining 
competitive  and  profitable  in  the  highly  competitive  yet  lucrative  world  of  investment 
banking  and  trading.    Although  joint-stock  banks  are  more  present  in  important  markets, 
                                                                                                                                                         
they did not operate with strict rules for diversification.  As late as 1980, only 5% of pension assets were foreign.  
In 2000, international securities were estimated to account for 15% of all pension assets.  Thirty-percent of all 
U.K. pension assets are in foreign securities.  According to some estimates, the placing of new securities relies 
greatly on close contact with 200-300 pension funds, mostly located in the United States and Great Britain.  
Risto Laulajainen, Financial Geography: A Banker’s View (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 52.  
3 Christos N. Pitelis and Roger Sugden, “On the Theory of the Transnational Firm,” in Christos N. Pitelis and 
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investors rely less now than 100 years ago on active management of specific risk, and more 
on public information and statistical analysis of variances and co-variances among assets.  
High  trading  volumes,  “standardization”  of  products  (sometimes  just  perceived),  lower 
transaction costs, tax-driven placements, as well as increased availability of data, computer 
power,  and  financial  risk-management  techniques  all  contribute  to  the  reliance  on 
diversification  and  arbitrage  as  investment  strategies  to  balance  risk  and  reward.    The 
application of many of  these techniques and the maximization of reward-risk relationship 
require a seamless exchange of information and funds as well as an ability to make markets 
for  exotic  and  at  times  highly  illiquid  instruments.    Management  of  risk  in  this  manner 
requires highly sophisticated systems and trading volumes, which have in turn contributed to 
investing  further  in  internalization  of  cross-border  banking  and  to  increasing  pressure  to 
insure a steady stream of new products and distribution.  Seen in this light, transnational 
institutions tend to reinforce the transnational rather than international character of finance. 
  Put  into  Chandlerian  terms,  the  effective  use  of  investment  in  management  and 
production of new products (financial instruments), which raise fixed costs, must be coupled 
with a steady marketing of those products to major end-users in order to achieve high and 
even volumes.  Once management capacity has been created, financial institutions, like their 
manufacturing and distribution counterparts, are obliged to diversify and grow to optimize the 
value of their investment.   
  I will also suggest that current and historical statistics about the amount of foreign 
direct investment and intracompany (intercompany in finance books) sales do not adequately 
reflect differences between the Gold Standard Era and our own form of globalization.  The 
degree to which firms like Deutsche Bank are run as integrated, cross-border firms is not clear 
from comparative international business statistics.  It must be drawn from individual case 
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procedures, information, funds, intermediary and final products, as well as human resources 
much easier.  Like investors and manufacturing firms, financial intermediaries are expected 
by their clients to offer integrated international services, drawing on talent, funds, and even 
legal entities from all over the world, which allow for the passage of services around the 
world that even in the recent past would only have been possible at one site.  In short, my 
story tries to go beyond the amounts and forms (portfolio and FDI) of foreign investment, but 
rather to show how institutions have adapted and shaped cross-border exchanges. 
 
Deutsche Bank and the changing configuration of international finance 
Deutsche Bank’s over 130-year long experience with American business must be seen 
against the backdrop of three distinctive regimes for cross-border banking and investment. 
(For the purposes of this paper, I have divided them as follows: 1870-1914; 1914-1971, and 
post 1971.)  The general political and economic macroeconomic configuration of each period 
understandably had many parallels in private relationships.  It is not just a question of the size 
of cross-border flows of finance and information but how they are done compared with the 
19
th century.   Although we have  a  good  general sense of the changes in macroeconomic 
regimes and the overall patterns of foreign direct investment, we know less about how they 
shaped firms’ specific international strategies and structures.
4 
For the forty  years preceding the  ‘Great War,”  voluntary linkages among nations and 
financial institutions provided the main mode of international banking.  Although the system 
was not as automatic and frictionless as some believed, governments in much of Europe and 
North  America  committed  themselves  to  macroeconomic  environment  stability.    Despite 
several shocks, they were relatively successful fulfilling this mandate.  Inflation was low, 
                                                 
4 Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 21.   As Jones reports, foreign direct investment in 1913 equaled 9% 
of world output, after the turmoil of world wars and the unstable interwar period reached 4.4% in 1960, only to 
regain its 1914 vigor just after 1990.  Estimates of FDI as a percentage of international investment in 1913 vary 
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economic  growth  high,  currencies  convertible,  and  investment  and  trade  flowed  across 
borders to an unprecedented degree.
5  But regulations of capital markets and for the issuance 
of shares by companies were rudimentary at best.  Accounting information in most countries 
was  scant  and  unreliable.
6    Banks  were  called  upon,  or  by  default,  to  fill  in  control  and 
information flows.  They provided or stood in the wings ready to provide active management 
to facilitate trust.   
In this environment, Deutsche Bank grew quickly and internationally, with relatively high 
and  consistent  profits.    For  most  of  this  period  and  in  several  major  markets,  it  worked 
through agents and correspondent banks for many kinds of international transactions.  Its 
international reputation helped build its domestic business.   From 1896 through 1914, when 
Germans made over Mark 20 billion of foreign portfolio investments (5.1 billion to the North 
America alone), Deutsche Bank was considered Germany’s premier international bank.
7   It 
listed several American securities on the German stock exchange, invested in such important 
American companies as Edison General Electric (one of the forerunner companies to GE), 
formed several different syndicates for investing in American securities, and played an active 
role in the restructuring of one of America’s largest railroads, the Northern Pacific.  By the 
late 1880s, nearly 40% of its capital was invested in the United States.  By 1914, while it 
owned and marketed in Germany and other countries, alone or in syndicates of individuals 
and other financial institutions, the securities of many important U.S. companies – in whose 
management it sometimes took an active part.  Much like modern investment banks, however, 
                                                 
5 For the linkages among countries for foreign investment, especially between the United States and Germany, 
see Mira Wilkins, “Foreign Banks and Foreign Investment in the United States,” Richard Tilly, “International 
Aspects of German Banking,” and Vincent P. Carosso and Richard Sylla, “U.S. Banks in International Finance,” 
all in International Banking, 1870-1914, eds. Rondo Cameron and V.I. Bovykin (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991).    For general comments about the nature and extent of globalization and the functioning of the 
Gold Standard see Harold James, The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 2001) and The Gold Standard in Theory and History, eds. Barry Eichengreen 
and Marc Flandreau.(London: Routledge, 1985). 
6 Jeff Fear and Christopher Kobrak, “Diverging Paths: Accounting for Corporate Governance in America and 
Germany,” Business History Review, Vol. 80 (2006), pp. 1-48. 
7 Tilly, p.96.  This amount represented approximately 40% of German GDP in 1914.  Portfolio investment is 
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  8 
its stakes for its own account tended to be much lower than in the late 1880s.    Although there 
were many cross-border flows between Germany and the United States (mostly German funds 
to  the  United  States),  those  movements  were  performed  in  the  context  of  German  and 
American national regulation.  Deutsche Bank’s main competitive advantage in international 
investment lay in its reputation for finding and stewarding securities, as well as its knowledge 
of German listing requirements and its distribution capacity in that country.    
To be sure, this strategy was by no means perfect, even in the pre-1914 environment.   
There were many setbacks and crises, and perhaps even a huge opportunity cost by not having 
more of a presence in the United States, but the bank achieved substantial results with U.S. 
securities, with no employees there, just agents and a few close relationships with American 
banks whose costs to Deutsche Bank were for the most part variable rather than fixed.
8 
From 1914 to 1971, the developed economies suffered intermittently from war, inflation, 
steep  and  long  economic  downturns,  unstable  foreign  exchange  rates,  and  blocked  funds.  
Periodically,  countries  “submitted”  to  the  control  of  supranational  agencies,  at  first,  for 
example, the Bank of International Settlements, and later the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund.  Predictably these agencies were successful only when national political and 
economic  circumstances  encouraged  cooperation.    When  they  didn’t,  national  priorities 
trumped international ones.  Predictably, the framework for Deutsche Bank’s U.S. business as 
well  as  general  international  business  fluctuated  between  no  business  at  all  and  coercion 
“cooperation.”  For a short time in the mid-1920, Deutsche Bank served as an intermediary 
for bringing American investment into Germany.  It even raised equity capital for itself on 
American markets.  By the1930s, however, economic circumstances were so bleak that only 
some “shady” transactions could save some of those securities launched in the United States 
from default.  Before World War II, returns to shareholders were volatile and small, especially 
                                                 
8 Christopher Kobrak, Banking on Global Markets: Deutsche Bank and the United States, 1870 to the Present 
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considering the risks and blocked profits.    In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the 
bank  was  in  danger  of  complete  dismemberment  by  American  occupation  authorities.  
Rebuilding international business relied on trade facilities, some of which had to be sponsored 
by government authorities.  (For approximately a decade Deutsche Bank actually operated as 
three separate banks.)   By the time the bank was reconstituted as a single entity in 1957, 
international cooperation with the goals and under the institutions of Bretton Woods was at its 
post-World  War  II  high  point.    Enjoying  the  benefits  Germany’s  Economic  Miracle  and 
strong German exports, by the 1960s, the bank began again to engage in some cross-border 
finance and even some foreign direct investment, but the playing field was starting to change 
very rapidly.  
Already  in  the  mid-1960s,  cross-border  investment  and  the  size  of  foreign  exchange 
movements threatened the ability of governments to preserve the Bretton Woods system.
9  
Without  the  discipline  of  the  pre-World  War  I  era,  and  faced  with  a  choice  between 
convertibility and stability, since 1971 governments in the developed world have by and large 
opted for convertibility of foreign exchange and free movement of capital.  This has led to 
greater investor needs to define and hedge risks – what some have called the privatization of 
foreign exchange and other risks – as well as to a host of new players attempting to take 
financial  advantage  of  instability  and  market  segmentation.        In  addition  to  private 
international brokers, many of banks’ most important customers became giant multinational 
corporations, capable of internalizing transactions once performed by separate legal entities. 
Managing foreign exchange exposures, intracompany payments (netting), cash positions and 
short-term  borrowing  for  foreign  subsidiaries  (pooling  centers),  cross-border  pricing  and 
logistics (reinvoicing centers), insurance, long-term financing and other financial issues has 
been increasingly coordinated or just performed centrally. These commercial institutions and 
                                                 
9 See, James, The End of Globalization, and Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the 
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other  financial  players  expect  their  banks  to  provide  useful  information  and  financial 
innovation, make a market for their trading in foreign exchange and other products, and offer 
all sorts of financing globally.    Even governments demand these services, which increasingly 
are done outside of their control, internally by huge intermediaries, which provide platforms 
for international financial dealings.  By the 21
st century, there were at least ten banks with 
assets greater than one trillion dollars.
10   
  To many of these developments in capital markets, Deutsche Bank’s ability to respond 
effectively was hampered in some sense by history.  Its early international success was built 
on  a  model  of  separate  countries,  with  good  regulation,  and  separate  institutions,  run  by 
responsible  financial  experts  in  their  own  markets,  who  shared  a  common  culture  and 
common desire to exchange information and capital.  This model was less applicable in the 
new financial world of the last decades of the 20
th century.  Added to this were the residue of 
political conflicts – the losses suffered after World War I and II, the perception of political 
risk, and Germany’s first divided and then united status.
11  In the post-Bretton Woods period, 
Deutsche Bank struggled to keep up with some trends in capital markets and intermediaries 
spearheaded by Anglophone institutions.  It had difficulty establishing critical mass in key 
markets and segments, such as the United States and in the lucrative areas of equity and 
derivative  trading.  With  its  acquisition  of  Bankers  Trust  and  other  steps  around  2000, 
Deutsche Bank has positioned itself to be an integrated investment bank (something like the 
model universal bank forbidden for a while by U.S. regulations), one that is able to marshal 
huge amounts of international capital, launch new securities, advise clients about M&A and 
other financial engineering, trade securities and derivatives, innovate and share information in 
key capitals of finance.
12  In response to market and regulatory developments, it internalized 
                                                 
10 The Banker, July 2005. 
11 Christopher Kobrak and Jana Wüstenhagen, “The Politics of Globalization: Deutsche Bank, German Property 
and Political Risk in the United States After World War II,” Enterprise et Histoire, 2007, No. 49, pp. 53-77. 
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cross-border flows of information in business units managed globally, and offered to create 
and deal in products once transacted through separate institutions and markets. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment Statistics and Intrafirm business.   
Although foreign direct investment today barely exceeds as a percentage of world product 
that of 1914, the raw data masks some qualitative difference in investment, which is true of 
financial as well as other sectors.  It ignores how diverse and interconnected international 
operations  of  multinationals  (MNCs)  have  become,  as  well  as  changes  in  portfolio 
investment.    Because  our  data  about  MNCs  before  World  War  I  is  less  complete,  to 
understand  the  changing  structure  and  importance  of  multinationals  some  anecdotal 
information is helpful.   Of the 50 largest economies in the world, 17 are corporations.  Many 
of the 100 largest corporations in the world not only have over half of their sales, as was the 
case for several German and American companies even before World War II, but also half of 
their assets and half of their employees are also outside of the country in which they are 
incorporated.  
 Two companies on which I have done detailed work shed light on the changes.  In 1913, 
Deutsche Bank had only a three foreign branches (London, Brussels, and Constantinople) and 
two subsidiaries for foreign ventures, one partially, the other wholly owned.  About 10% of its 
employees  worked  outside  Germany.
13    As  mentioned,  in  the  United  States,  the  world’s 
largest  economy,  its  interests  were  handled  by  a  representative  and  correspondent  banks.  
Before 1913, few Deutsche Bank employees visited the United States (approximately four 
visits by top management, four by middle management).  There were no foreign members of 
its management board.  Today, seven members of its 11-person executive committee are non-
German.  Many of the bank’s top executives are still stationed outside of the country in which 
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the bank is incorporated.  Well over half of the bank’s staff is outside of Germany and nearly 
half  of  its  1700  installations.    The  bank  employs  roughly  12,000  people  in  its  Americas 
operation alone, working in approximately 600 legal entities.
14    
In 1900, Schering AG had no legal entities in the United States, despite significant sales 
from that and other foreign markets.  Its affairs in the United States were represented by a 
separate legal entity headed by a nephew of the company’s founder.
15  Just before its merger 
with Bayer, Schering had two-thirds of its employees outside of Germany and approximately 
half of its R & D expenditures outside of Europe.
16   Although there are a few companies that 
maintained  relatively  well  integrated  foreign  subsidiaries  before  World  War  I  (Siemens, 
Singer, and Standard Oil come to mind) and our information is limited, the experiences of 
Deutsche Bank and Schering AG, I contend, are much more indicative of the transitions of 
large companies from international business to transnational firms than the experiences of 
Siemens, Singer, and Standard Oil were before World War I.  In short, multinationals in the 
21
st  century  tend  to  be  run  as  one  worldwide  concern,  not  splintered  as  domestic  and 
international ones.
17 
Foreign direct investment by banks is a relative latecomer and less is known about the 
cross-border  management  of  financial  firms.    Before  the  late  1950s,  most  European  and 
American  banks’  foreign  direct  investment  was  toward  colonies,  former  colonies,  and 
countries with which European nations and America had a quasi-colonial relationship.  Before 
1914, both Japanese and American banks had very limited foreign operations.  As late as 
1925, American banks operated just over 100 foreign branches, mostly in Latin America.  
Even during the late 1950s, only seven American banks had overseas operations while foreign 
                                                 
14 Kobrak, Banking on Global Markets, p. 365..  
15 Christopher Kobrak, National Cultures and International Competition: The Experience of Schering AG, 1850-
1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).   
16 Schering AG, 2004 Annual Report. 
17 Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprises: American Business Abroad from the Colonial Era 
to 1914 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1973) pp. 212-213.  In 1914, operating foreign subsidiaries 
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banks had virtually no business in the United States.
18  Although we know that services have 
climbed from 30% of FDI to 50% since 1913, we have little data about the flows of services 
within firms.  The data about intrafirm trade is mostly about manufacturing firms.  From 1970 
to 2000, intrafirm trade seems to have grown from 20 to 40% of world trade, but this tells us 
little about the banking sector’s exchange of information and financial flows.
19  The data is 
about intrafirm trade is just that goods and services, not, for example, about intracompany 
foreign exchange and derivatives trading, and loans.   We have far less data about flows of 
capital in general and exchanges among financial firms.   
By 2000, commercial banks had created a huge network of branches and subsidiaries all 
over the world.  Most developed countries had accepted that foreign banks could do outside of 
their own country whatever they did inside.  In the United States alone, foreign banks operate 
300 branches – that is, entities that are not legally or financially distinct from their parents – 
and nearly 100 subsidiaries, mostly for making wholesale rather than retail loans.  From 1975 
to 2000, total assets by foreign banks grew in the United States from approximately $50 
billion in 1975 to $1.2 trillion in 2000, which accounted for approximately 20% of all banking 
assets in the United States.
20   In 2000 after its acquisition of Bankers Trust, Deutsche Bank, 
by some measures the largest bank in the world, headed the list of foreign banks in the United 
States with nearly $113 billion in assets.
21   
During  the  last  few  decades  of  the  20
th  century,  U.S.  banks  were  among  the  most 
aggressive in foreign investment.  From 1975 to 2000, U.S. banks with foreign branches grew 
from 8 to 126, total branches alone for those U.S. banks from 131 to 762, while assets of 
                                                 
18 Jones, 114 and 135. 
19 Jones, p. 40.  A more recent study found that 43% of all U.S. exports were intrafirm transactions; 43% of all 
U.S. imports were intrafirm transactions by American or foreign-owned companies. Stephen D. Cohen, 
Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment: Avoiding Simplicity, Embracing Complexity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 210-211. 
20 Jane E. Hughes and Scott B. MacDonald, International Banking (New York: Addison Wesley, 2002), pp. 27, 
90-101, 149.  By the early 90s, 280 foreign banks from 65 countries with 1,000 offices operated in the United 
States.  
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foreign branches of U.S. banks climbed from $3.5 to 176.5 billion.  By 1996, U.S. banks held 
over $1.1 trillion in assets in overseas branches and subsidiaries taken together.  During the 
first half of 1999, for example, 8 of the top 20 issuers of West European corporate bonds were 
American banks, accounting for roughly the same percentage of the value of the bonds.  Much 
of  international  banking  remained  centered  in  London,  whose  historical  accumulation  of 
know-how and technical skills as well as balanced regulation seem to be nearly as enticing in 
2000 as in 1900.  Circa 2000, nearly 520 foreign banks employing 72,000 people operated in 
London.  These banks are particularly active in cross-border lending – loans to a borrower in a 
country other than the lenders or in a currency other than the lenders – an activity that doubled 
from 1988 to 1998, much of which was done on a syndicate basis, requiring banks to band 
together to reduce risk and marshal huge sums of money.
22     
 
Capital Markets and financial management circa 2000.   
Regulation and other factors have led to a reduced market share of banks as financial 
intermediaries.  Although some of these developments arose out of efforts to escape American 
regulation and recent banking regulation have led to the creation of financial institutions more 
akin to German universal banks, for some observers they are part of the Americanization of 
business.
23  In the last decades of the 20
th century, capital markets have been increasing large 
areas of economic activity, reducing the scope of straight bank financing.  Whereas all banks 
accounted for 85% of financial activity by some in 1900, by 1992 that percentage had fallen 
                                                 
22 Jane E. Hughes and Scott B. MacDonald, International Banking (New York: Addison Wesley, 2002), pp. 27, 
90-101, 149. 
23 See Harm G. Schröter, Americanization of the European Economy: A Compact Survey of American Economic 
Influence in Europe since the 1880s (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005) for an excellent survey of American influence 
in Europe.  Although there is little about the specific recent influences in banking, much of what he writes about 
the more “cultural” influences of business practices certainly applies to financial services.  There is no doubt that 
the style of global  investment banking, for example, has been greatly affected by American practices.  For a 
very good discussion of the flight of American banks from U.S. regulation see Richard Sylla, “United States 
Banks and Europe: Strategy and Attitudes,” in Stefano Battilossi and Youssef Cassis, eds.  European Banks and 
the American Challenge: Competition and Cooperation in International Banking Under Bretton Woods (Oxford: 





































8From International to Transnational Finance  - April 2008 
 
  15 
to less than 40%.  The change is mainly due to easier access to capital markets and the arrival 
of new financial intermediaries, such as pension and mutual funds.
24  Separated from some of 
their traditional sources of funds and activities, resilient players have been able to replace 
some  of  their  traditional  activities  by  innovative new  ones  and  by  spreading  out  of  their 
national  markets  to  become  global  intermediaries,  capable  of  interfacing  with  users  and 
providers of funds all over the world.  Like many commercial spheres of globalization, the 
process of spreading sophisticated banking services and the mobility of money and people 
have been accompanied paradoxically by an urban concentration in key markets, such as New 
York and London.
25   
Securities  markets  rely  on  prices  based  to  a  large  extent  on  public  information  and 
competitive interplay by self-interested, well-informed actors.  Since the 1930s, and perhaps 
before, investment banks have tended to commit less of their own capital to fund clients.  For 
fees,  they  create  a  network  of  investors  who  trust  the  bank  to  serve  as  a  financial 
intermediary, quickly disseminating the appropriate levels of public and private information, a 
kind of market within a market or as some call it an “information market.”
26  They create an 
environment for information production.  They advise clients about lowering financial costs, 
using their balance sheets to expand, and about the use of derivative instruments.  During the 
past few decades, with the breakdown in the separation of financial services, many institutions 
not only make loans but also take deposits as a source of funding for new and old securities 
issuances.  Not only have regulations created a new opportunity for traditional banks and 
other  institutions  to  recombine  old  “universal  banking  services”  (the  “Germanization”  of 
finance) those institutions also have added some new ones, such as hedge fund management.   
                                                 
24 Meir Kohn, Financial Institutions and Markets (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), p. 202. 
25 Saskia Sassen, Globalization and its Discontents:  Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money (New 
York: New Press, 1998), pp. IXX-XXXVI.  For an excellent discussion of how standardization and increased 
power of diffusion have led to the concentration of economic power in these centers and the weakening of 
political power.  See also Youssef Cassis, Capitals of Capital: A History of International Finance Centres, 1780-
2005 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) for the role of financial centers in history . 
26 Alan D. Morrison and William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law (Oxford: 
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Moreover, given their asset base and knowledge of primary and secondary securities markets, 
it is understandable that the banks are active traders.   
The banks’ willingness to buy and sell securities gives investors added security that their 
positions will be more liquid, when they want to get rid of them.  But actual trading has 
become  a  cross-border  enterprise.    From  1983  to  1993  cross-border  transactions  in  U.S. 
treasuries went from $30 to $500 billion.  Sales and purchases of bonds and equities between 
foreigners and U.S. residents went from roughly 10% of U.S. GDP to 135%.  During the same 
period, in Britain they jumped from virtually nothing to 1000% of GDP.
27  
These statistics are reflected in the increase of portfolio investment.  Although estimates 
of  FDI  by  some  measures  grew  from  8.3%  of  world  output  in  1913  to  11.3%  in  1999, 
portfolio investment has grown even faster, from 18- 25 to 40-57%%.  These figures do not 
include the fastest growing segment of capital markets, derivatives trading.  (Also portfolio 
investment does not include short-term (less than one year) securities.)  During the last 
decade, despite the huge increase in FDI, growth in portfolio investment outstripped more 
long-term, stable investment.
28  With the United States running a nearly one-trillion dollar per 
year current account deficit, these increases are likely to continue into the future to funnel 
funds held by exporters into U.S. and U.K. capital markets, a scary parallel to the recycling of 
funds in the 1920s and 1970s.  Although some theorists see integrated, multinational banks as 
providing an additional service of diversifying investors among regions and financial sectors, 
thereby reducing risk, others worry that they add to the risk by making cross-border flows too 
simple and therefore too volatile.    
With this as a backdrop, it is probably no accident that cross-border bank mergers and 
other forms of direct investment have picked up in the last 20 years.  The most active modern 
investment banks have reassumed a broad range of activities and have internationalized them, 
                                                 
27 John Eatwell and Lance Taylor, Global Finance at Risk: The Case for International Regulation (New York: 
New Press, 2000), p. 4. 





































8From International to Transnational Finance  - April 2008 
 
  17 
effectively internalizing what were cross-border, cross-firm exchanges.  Greater increases in 
market activity and lowering of transaction costs have led to greater investments to handle 
them, which in turn put pressure on participants for more activity to lower unit costs.    The 
required infrastructure and investment has climbed a good deal since Deutsche Bank ran one 
of the largest banks in the world in 1914 with a considerable “international reach” with fewer 
employees than it now has in New York alone.  Although computer power per dollar of 
investment has increased enormously over the past 20 years, demands on financial institutions 
to electronically manage information have led to great increases in digital investment.  The 
cost of controlling all of this is significant.  Although some international organizations have 
tried to get a handle on the risks of modern finance, most observers believe that their efforts 
are always a step behind the innovative machines of money markets.
29  To their credit, most 
large  banks  have  recognized  their  own  interests  in  getting  a  grip  on  the  risk-reward 
relationships  of  their  products,  especially  financially  innovative  new  ones.    Creating  and 
implementing these systems, however, requires investment in computing and people power, 
and an ability to carefully evaluate new products and activities.
30     
Three numbers from 1913 and 1999 are helpful to illustrate the relationship of investment, 
cost and market power.  Although Deutsche Bank, like many German banks, helped control 
companies and capital markets, even performing many market functions internally in 1913, it 
now performs these market functions on a much greater international scale.  The numbers are 
Deutsche Bank’s net income, total assets, and the size of German GDP.  For 1913, they were 
Mark 68.3 million, 2.3 billion, and 48 billion respectively.  In 2004, net income, assets, and 
GDP were Euro 2.5 billion, 840 billion, and 1.5 trillion respectively.  Consider the following 
                                                 
29 Shelagh Hefferman, Modern Banking in Theory and Practice (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1996), pp. 217-267 
and Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work: The Next Steps to Global Justice (New York: Allen Lane, 
2006. 
30 Bankers Trust, which Deutsche Bank bought in 1998, was considered the market leader in this kind of 
analysis.  See Gene D. Guill,  “Bankers Trust and the Birth of Modern Risk Management,” Case Study, Wharton 
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ratios for 1913 and 2004:  Net income to assets was down approximately from 3% to 0.3% 
respectively.  While Germany’s largest bank held assets that amounted to approximately 5% 
of the German economy in 1913, by the same measure, they represent 50% of the German 
economy in 2004.
31   Costs and investment may be climbing even faster than opportunities.      
Investment and other banks are under increasing pressures to handle greater operating 
scale and more financial capital over a larger area.  For example, New York Stock Exchange 
average daily trading volume has gone up from less than five million shares in 1960 to over 
1.4 billion in 2000.  The daily volume of foreign exchange trading hovers around $2.0 trillion, 
approximately  85%  of  which  is  done  by  market  makers,  primarily  large  banks.    Total 
derivatives trading was approximately 35 times greater in 2000 than in 1988; 90% of the total 
$109 trillion in transactions are OTC (Over-the-counter private transactions), mainly banks, 
not organized exchanges.
32  (Like foreign exchange trading, a great many of these transactions 
are  not  driven  by  commercial  transactions  but  rather  are  arbitrage-related.)    International 
securities offerings grew from virtually nothing to $1.2 trillion in 1983 dollars.   Moreover, 
international  M&A  activity  grew  from  virtually  nothing  in  1980  to  $2.0  trillion  in  1998, 
during the same period, an amount two-thirds larger than the most active market for domestic 
M&A, the United States.
33  Through much of the 1990s, by some measures, banking and other 
finance firms themselves were the most active targets and acquirers in M&A deals.
34   
No wonder!  The incentives and pressures to acquirer  greater scale  and scope are 
enormous.  The large fees earned by investment banks are legendary, but competition and 
expenditures are growing quickly too.  While the advising, underwriting and trading revenue 
(once the highest component of revenues) of the top 10 investment banks as a percentage of 
capitalization have all dropped as a percentage of investment bank capitalization since 1980, 
                                                 
31 Adapted from Deutsche Bank’s annual reports, 1913 and 2004, and Wikipedia. 
32 Morrison and Wilhelm, p. 10. 
33 Morrison and Wilhelm, p. 2. 
34 Patrick A. Gaughan,  Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
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trading revenue in 2000 was nearly half of advisory revenue and nearly five times that of 
underwriting revenue.  Employment in investment banking has increased dramatically since 
1979 (by some measures fourfold), but increases in capital formation have been even more 
pronounced.  Since 1990, they have  climbed by  a factor of six.  Mean capitalization per 
employee  for  the  five  largest  investment  banks  has  grown  from  $200,000  in  1990  to 
approximately $1,000,000 in 2000.  Revenue income per producing employee for the same 
period jumped $0.4 to $1.0.
35  In the last decade of the 20
th century, market capitalizations of 
equity as a percentage of GDP doubled in Germany (to 60%) and tripled in the United States 
(160%).
36  Much of that new investment in Germany and the United States came from foreign 
sources, especially institutional investors.  Debt markets and the size of international debt 
offerings have grown enormously in the past 40 years (total outstanding debt issues stood at 
$21 trillion in 2002
37), but at the same time investment bank commissions as a percentage of 
large issues have declined greatly from 1970 to 2000, from 6% to 4% for new equity, and 
even more dramatically for debt – in which Deutsche Bank traditionally excelled – from 1% 
to .5% of proceeds.  From 1982 to 2004, eurocurrency loans (offshore borrowing) has climbed 
from $1.0 trillion in 1982 to $9.9 trillion in 2004.   New international bonds went from $82 
billion to $1.6 trillion during the same period.
38   
In conclusion, the  explosion of trading volumes, new instruments, new sources of 
funding,  international  investment,  and  the  need  for  high-speed  distribution  of  financial 
products  and  for  the  acquiring  and  dissemination  of  information  have  had  several 
consequences.  On the one hand, they have created new opportunities for “universal banks” 
that prepared to respond to them.  One of those responses has been to internalize much of 
their cross-border activities.  By adding fixed costs, they can lower their unit costs at certain 
                                                 
35 Morrison and Wilhelm, pp.8-15.  Nearly one-quarter of the total. 
36 Alan D. Morrison and William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) P. 2 
37 Moorad Choudhry, Corporate Bonds and Structured Financial Products (London: Elsevier, 2004), p. 8. 
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levels of activity.  On the other hand, investment banks have entered a demanding cycle of 
ever-increasing expenditures in managing information and a presence in important securities 
markets to acquire capital and talent than ever before, in order to keep up with competition 
and declining marginal returns.  They are under pressure to get more out of each component 
of profit generation.   Returns on capital invested are declining while capital requirements are 
increasing.  While dependence in one sense in human capital has declined, banks have had to 
squeeze out more revenue per employee hired.  All of these developments have had a hand in 
shifting investment banking from an activity dominated by private firms to one dominated by 
large, integrated public firms.  As late as the 1960s, at least six of the largest ten underwriters 
of  U.S.  equities  were  private  firms.    Despite  the  importance  of  “reputational  capital”  in 
investment banking, by 2003, not one was.
39 
What is still unclear, however, is whether the perception that internalization across 
national borders on the scale we have seen still brings economic and social value.  To be sure, 
the economic incentives to create transnational firms are great.  We also have these firms to 
thank for a good deal of our international connections, and economic prosperity and freedom, 
and for the liquidity and efficiency of capital markets.    But as R. H. Coase, the economist 
credited with highlighting cost reduction as an explanation of large companies moving from 
market  to  internal  exchanges,  pointed  out  that  there  may  be  diminishing  returns  to 
internalization  as  firms  grow  due  to  increasing  organization  costs,  which  are  difficult  for 
economists and managers to see.  He is also credited with being one of the first economists to 
emphasize the potential social costs of business, those costs to society that are not included in 
a firm’s accounts.
40  As some firms become too big too fail or perhaps to control, the issues of 
                                                 
39 Morrison and Wilhelm, pp. 15-21.  It should be noted that all of the firms that actually disappeared were 
absorbed by larger firms. 
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moral hazard and political control are fair ones to raise.
41  No one who knows me in this room 
would accuse me of being a Marxist, but the growth in the size and power of these institutions 
coupled with their struggles to cope with reduced profitability would not have surprised the 
“Sage of Trier.” 
  
                                                 
41 Hughes and MacDonald, pp. 156-157.  I heard a number a few days ago that I have not yet verified: the 
notional  amount  of  outstanding  derivatives  is  $450  trillion  compared  with  a  world  GP  of  $50  trillion.    It 
reminded me of a case that I use to teach in international finance about the treasurer of Air Liquide who did so 
much swap trading (a form of derivative) that he lost track of his positions and the purpose behind the trades.  
We might all wonder whether the case is a microcosm for the whole financial system.  
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